details on the circumstances engendering new unions. The leader among the historians employing ricordanze for family history is Klapisch-Zuber, whose essay "Zacharias, or the Ousted Father" has illuminated the sequence and meanings of the rites culminating in a legally valid marriage in Florence 4 . The Florentine prenuptial scenario was premised on the primacy of the family -on the cultural conviction that marriages are generated by families, in contrast to today's prevailing conviction, at least in the West, that families are generated by marriages. By convention the scenario began when a household head (father, widowed mother, senior male kinsman) enlisted the services of a marriage broker (sensale) to find a spouse for marriageable daughters and sons. Not only were marriages arranged for girls who were customarily thought of as weak-minded, it was legally and morally incumbent on a paterfamilias to arrange marriages on their behalf with men whose social worth approximated that of his own family. A marriageable son, who became a household head on the death of his father, also relied on marriage brokers. Other intermediaries (mezzani), normally immediate kin and friends, were enlisted to assist in the negotiations. A private meeting between the parties and their kinsmen followed successful preliminary negotiations. At this meeting the representatives of the prospective spouses concluded an alliance between the two families (fermare il parentado), which was emphatically affirmed by a ritual handclasp (impalamento) 5 . It was common for the parties, often after wheeling and dealing, to settle on the amount of the dowry the future bridegroom would receive upon marriage. From the fifteenth century on, prenuptial arrangements were normally recorded in a scritta, a private written agreement safeguarded by the intermediaries. There is no hint that Florentines cast horoscopes, as is done in India today, to determine the compatibility of the prospective spouses and the most auspicious time for the wedding. The expression fermare il parentado was the social equivalent of fermare una compagnia, the expression for forming a business company. The commercial component of alliance making and matchmaking became a convenient target for moralists and was satirized by the novellieri Franco Sacchetti and Giovanni Sercambi and the poet Antonio Cammelli of Pistoia. In referring to prenuptial negotiations as la mercanzia Sacchetti meant to underscore that matchmaking in Florence was little more than a commercial venture 6 . Cammelli (1436-1502) was critical of the social script in which nubile girls were loveless pawns of venal parents and grubby marriage brokers. One of his sonnets depicts a widowed mother as reprehensibly impatient to find a husband for her daughter 7 . Pietro, the marriage broker, informs her that he has found a suitable groom who is not only rich but also "virtuous, polite, and well attired, and has never uttered a bad word". She tells Pietro "he will have in exchange a charming girl. She can do what he wishes and in her behavior is chaste, respectable, docile, and beautiful". Her mother promises a dowry of a . 5 The Glossa explained that the meaning of pactum derived from a striking of the palms. See the gloss Percussit to l. Sciendum (D. 50.15.1): "id est pactum fecit, nam dicitur a percussione palmarum"; and the gloss Pactum to l. Huius edicti (D. 2.14.1.1), after Accursius has given Isidore's ethymology of "pactum", he states: "Vel dicitur pactum a percussione palmarum". The term impalmare , which is now a literary or facetious term, originally meant "to promise a girl as a bride" as well as "to shake someone's hand as a sign of agreement". thousand gold ducats, half of which she agrees to pay in advance. Eager to conclude the match, she instructs Pietro to see to it "that the young man be informed. Act in earnest! Conduct the deal and let the contract be signed". In order to be paid, Pietro quickly arranges the business, and the parties conclude the contract at breakneck speed (in un punto il col scavezza) 8 . Cammelli's disapproval of the marriage market most likely amused his knowing audience, yet, as we argue below, there were sound reasons for the rush to marriage. Soon after the agreement to fermare il parentado, the couple was solemnly betrothed or espoused (giuramento, compromesso) in the presence of witnesses. It was the sponsa's (future bride's) legal and moral protector -father, widowed mother, brother, or kinsman -who publicly promised that he or she would ensure that the absent bride-to-be would give her future consent to take the sponsus (bridegroom) as her lawful husband, to contract marriage with him, and to receive from him a ring signifying the legitimate union of the couple. Faithfully reflecting practice, sponsae were typically absent in literary representations of prenuptial negotiations and the giuramento. Florentines would have undoubtedly endorsed Petrus de Ancharano's admonition that it was unnecessary for the prospective bride and bridegroom to know each other personally for the purpose of contracting betrothals or marriages 9 . Indeed, c anon and Roman law sanctioned betrothals and marriages contracted between people who were absent (inter absentes) 10 . Marriage by proxy still remains a possibility in contemporary Italy. Courts have allowed them to occur when one of the parties lives abroad and compelling reasons exist for the marriage to proceed. No indication is given in ricordanze or other sources that Florentine couples, as other couples in Europe, treated "betrothal as a trial marriage and normally slept together once they had exchanged future consent" 11 . While marriages per verba de futuro carnali copula subsecuta were fairly common throughout Europe before the Council of Trent 12 , Florentine merchant families intent on preserving their honor were successful in keeping contact between sponsae/sponsi de futuro to a minimum. The constraints on the sexuality of upper-class unmarried women, on the other hand, contrast with the lack of constraints on low-status rural and urban youth, for whom "premarital intercourse was evidently accepted and widespread, as long as relations were initiated with an intent to marry, or at least create a stable bond" 13 . High-status male predators, however, habitually seduced gullible low-status girls and women with promises to marry at a future time, which they had no intention of keeping.
In his turn, the sponsus promised that he would take the sponsa as his lawful wife. If the sponsus could not give his de futuro promise to marry, because he had not yet reached the age of fourteen, the promise would be made by his father or close kinsman. When a sponsus of legal age was absent from the city, the promise to marry at a future time would be given by a duly appointed agent, which was how the Florentine lay canonist Lorenzo d'Antonio Ridolfi was betrothed. On April 2, 1388, Niccolò Ridolfi, acting as Lorenzo's agent, made an agreement with the Barucci family committing his brother to future marriage with Caterina Barucci. At the time, the twenty-six-old Lorenzo was in Bologna, having just passed his doctoral examination in canon law at the city's university. The giuramento took place on April 20, with Niccolò again acting as his brother's agent, promising that Lorenzo would take Caterina as his lawful wife (per verba de futuro). The following July, having returned to Florence, Lorenzo met his wife for the first time 14 . The giuramento customarily included an agreement on the date of marriage and the composition of the dowrynamely, cash, credits in the public debt (monte comune), goods, and real property. If the betrothed had not yet reached puberty, the parties agreed to entrust mutually acceptable intermediaries (prudentes et discreti viri) with the decision o f establishing the date of marriage and the composition of the dowry (as in Angelus's consilium II below). The sponsus was not required to pledge his fidelity by placing a ring on the sponsa's finger. Nor was the exchange of a kiss obligatory 15 . In Florence, the absence of the sponsa at the formal betrothal made the betrothal ring and kiss moot. The Roman law prohibition still in force against interspousal gifts did not apply to gifts exchanged by a couple betrothed but unmarried. After the giuramento was concluded, it was customary for the sponsus to pledge his fidelity by sending to his betrothed a chest (forzerino) containing rings, precious stones, belts, and other goods, and by celebrating the betrothal with a dinner at his future in-laws' house. A sponsa's acceptance of gifts in anticipation of marriage established a presumption, unless contrary proof was produced, that she had given her consent to the betrothal made on her behalf 16 . Betrothal gifts were treated neither as the Roman donatio propter nuptias 17 nor as the Germanic morgengabe 18 , nor even as earnest money or a pledge, which the sponsus would forfeit in the event he failed to fulfill the betrothal contract. The betrothal gifts belonged to the husband, and he could demand the return of them at any time 19 prenuptial and nuptial gifts was not transferred to the wife (non intelligantur esse mulieris nec intelligatur translatum dominium a sponso in sponsam), and thus, apart from wedding rings, they had to be restored upon demand to the husband or his heirs 20 . Later -sometimes days, sometimes months, and, on occasion, years later -the couple contracted marriage through an exchange of words of present consent, followed by the annelamento, the ringing of the bride. According to Florentine jurists, the groom's giving of the ring and bride's reception constituted extrinsic signs (signa extrinseca) or presumptive evidence of marriage 21 . Marriage vows were almost always performed in the bride's home. Ricordanze include details about the wedding festivities; the composition and exchange of nuptial gifts; the transfer of the dowry, in part or whole; the husband's acknowledgement of the dowry in a notarial instrument called confessio dotis; the time and place of the marriage's consummation; and the introduction of the bride into the husband's household. As Klapisch-Zuber has observed 22 , before the decrees of the Council of Trent, which made the validity of the nuptial rite dependent on the presence of the priest and his blessing, it was the notary who officiated at the betrothal and marriage and who attested to the solemn exchange of consent between the parties 23 . As canon law validated not only the substitution of public notaries for priests at betrothal and marriage ceremonies, but also the legal effects of these solemn exchanges of consent, it is anachronistic to treat these ceremonies as civic and secular and distinct from religious rites. In contrast to the private setting of the ceremony of marriage, betrothals among upper-level families in the late Trecento and early Quattrocento were customarily celebrated in church and typically presided over by a notary. The betrothal of Lena di Bernardo Sassetti in 1384, for example, was celebrated in the church of the Cistercian Badia Fiorentina, the city's richest monastery (appendix 1). During this period, public notice of the impending marriage was not given. And o bjections to the marriage were seldom interposed, probably because betrothals violating the church's prohibition against consanguineous marriages, at least among Florence's merchant families, were rare 24 . The public and solemn setting of the Florentine betrothals, however, was designed to accomplish two critical tasks. First, the public betrothal announced to the community that a socially and politically consequential alliance between the two families had been sealed. Second, it announced that the betrothed were spoken for and that they had exited the marriage market. It was now difficult for one of the parties to unilaterally or 31 . Curiously, none of the betrothal witnesses belonged to the clergy, who appear as witnesses in testaments and other transactions. On the other hand, our evidence somewhat differs from Cohn's finding that the acts of betrothal, marriage, and dowry acknowledgment were separated by a few days and seldom by more than a month. His finding is more applicable to the occurrence of marriage contracts and confessiones dotium, which were frequently recorded on the same day in Florence and its contado 32 , and less applicable to the interval between betrothals and marriages. For thirteen of the sixteen sponsalia contracts in our admittedly tiny sample, Giacomini recorded subsequent marriages. It is likely that the three remaining marriages were recorded by other notaries, or that conceivably the marriages did not occur owing to the death of a future spouse. Three betrothals and subsequent marriages occurred within one day 33 , all the rest within a matter of months 34 . The year-and-a-half lapse 25 Princes, it seems, had little compunction about breaking betrothal agreements on grounds of political expediency. See between the betrothal and marriage of Agostina di Zanobi de' Bardi to the banker Roberto di Buoni was unusually long and risky 35 . In Florence and other Italian cities, especially during this plagueinfested period, the rush to marriage was prompted by fear that the longer the interval, the greater the possibility that the marriage, and therefore the family alliance, would not take place owing to the death of one of the sponsa or sponsus. But there were other good reasons for not waiting to contract marriage. Sponsi wanted the dowry promised them, which was customarily conveyed at the time marriage was contracted. To dampen suspicions invited by a long interval that the betrothed were behaving dishonorably, it was in everyone's interest to conclude the marriage in measured haste.
Breaking Betrothals
Helmholz reminds us that canon law departed from Roman civil law by making a "contract by words of future consent ... specifically enforceable in church courts. Even where the espousals were entered into without the force of an oath, where the contract was a nudum pactum, the canon law granted an action to secure its enforcement" 36 . The proof text authorizing compulsion was the canon Ex litteris Silvani (X 4.1.10), in which a breaching party, under threat of ecclesiastical censure 37 , is compelled to fulfill the betrothal promise. If the breaching party disobeys the order to marry, he and his father are to be excommunicated, unless it can be shown that a legitimate cause exists impeding the marriage. Because of these conditions, we have deliberately avoided employing the terms "engagement", "fiancé" and "fiancée", and "fidanzamento", which in recent and current usage lack the binding force carried by medieval sponsalia, sponsus, and sponsa 38 . Determining whether a breach of contract was committed when marriage did not follow the betrothal was a matter for legal experts and church authorities. No breach of contract ensued, the canonists agreed, where the sponsa and sponsus voluntarily and mutually consented to withdraw from the betrothal with authorization from their bishop, or where a party proved that the betrothal promise was coerced 39 , or where the death of a party made marriage an impossibility. A party's subsequent serious physical or mental infirmity or entrance into a religious order also constituted legitimate reasons for dissolving the betrothal contract. Recall that after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine withdrew from the betrothal that his mother Monica had arranged on his behalf with a ten-year-old heiress 40 . In other cases, a marriage might become impossible when a party had not yet reached puberty on the agreed-upon date of marriage, when the parties were related to each other within prohibited degrees or when they came to be related by affinity, or 35 when one of the parties was already betrothed or married 41 . A future marriage might be derailed if one of the parties was declared infamous or committed fornication with a third party, or if the future bridegroom was absent from the city for a protracted period -conventionally , two years 42 . In theory, ecclesiastical courts, operating under the presumption matrimonium gaudet favore iuris, should have been inclined to grant the petition of the party seeking to enforce the betrothal contract. In practice, church courts were disinclined to compel an obdurate party to marry, which would have undermined the sacred principle that choosing a spouse must be ultimately grounded in consent given freely with a clear mind 43 . Church courts in Paris and Regensburg allowed the dissolution of betrothals where one party repudiated the betrothal contract, but they ordered the breaching party to compensate the other party for expenses incurred in anticipation of marriage 44 . The available published evidence suggests that adjudication of disputes in Italian church courts of the validity and performance of betrothal contracts occurred infrequently, at least before the Council of Trent 45 . Only a handful of cases involving betrothal contracts were adjudicated before the diocesan courts in fifteenth-century Florence and Fiesole 46 . None of the litigants belonged to families of high social standing. In the middle of the fifteenth century, statutes enacted in Bologna, Carpi, Modena, and Piombino imposed penalties on parties contracting and breaking multiple betrothals 47 . These statutes were aimed at the chronic problems caused by clandestine betrothals and marriages. Incensed that their children were betrothed and married without parental and family approval, parents and relatives pressured the sponsae and sponsi to break their promises, so that they could be married to people who had received the family's approval. The statutes also refer to violent reprisals undertaken by the jilted parties. As far as we know, Florentines who were victims of broken betrothal promises in the late Trecento and Quattrocento resorted to legal remedies rather than to violence 48 . Long gone were the days when the Florentine knight Buondelmonte de' Buondelmonti was murdered for breaking his solemn pledge to take as his wife an Amidei girl. Like many marriages among warring noble families in the early Duecento, Buondelmonte's marriage had been arranged to keep peace between the two families. However, he was enticed by Forteguerra Donati's wily widow to break his betrothal and marry instead her daughter, whose rare beauty captivated him. As an inducement, the widow promised that she would pay the penalty (pena) for Buondelmonte's repudiation, which, as we know, did not quench the Amidei's and their allies' thirst for revenge. According to Florentine tradition, the dramatic murder of Buondelmonte at the foot of Ponte Vecchio beneath a statute of Mars in 1215 ignited the Guelph-Ghibelline conflict, which devastated the city for generations 49 . The lesson of Buondelmonte's ill-fated betrayal was immortalized by Dante: "o Buondelmonte, quanto mal fuggisti / le nozze sue per li altrui conforti". (Paradiso, XVI, 140-141). In Florence, the name Buondelmonte became synonymous with a groom who could not be trusted to fulfill his betrothal contract. The lead character in Giovanni Sercambi's satiric depiction of betrothal practices among noble Florentine families was purposefully given the name messer Renaldo de' Buondelmonte. He wants to marry Ginevra, the daughter of messer Lanfranco Rucellai, and after the standard preliminaries, the two families come to an agreement on the betrothal and marriage. Lanfranco's wife is delighted with her daughter's betrothal to Renaldo but wants them to marry immediately, for she is alarmed that he will change his mind. Sercambi's audience, familiar with the story of the nonfictional Buondelmonte, would h ave instantly appreciated the wife's shrewdness. Relating her fears to her dull-witted husband, she urges him to find the notary who had come with Renaldo and who had prepared the sponsalitium, so that he can draw up the marriage contract. Lanfranco finds Renaldo who is agreeable to the wife's plan. Soon afterward Renaldo arrives with his kinsmen and his notary at Lanfanco's house. The couple then exchange present-tense vows and the bride is given a beautiful ring, all of which is attested by the notary in the contract of marriage 50 . Later, Renaldo, amid pomp and circumstance, introduce s Ginevra into his household.
Arrhae Sponsaliciae
Breach of promise to marry in Roman law, unlike English common law, was not actionable. Under Codex 5.1.1, Alii desponsata, a sponsa was free to withdraw from her betrothal promise to one person and marry another. At the same time, Roman emperors and their jurists sought to deter breach of betrothal promises by requiring the sponsus or his family to put up arrhae sponsaliciae (earnest money), which became a standard feature of betrothal contracts in the late Roman Empire and of the notarized contracts in the Middle Ages. The standard Roman law model 48 The Florentine merchant Giovanni di Pagolo Morelli recounted in his ricordi that before he married Caterina d'Alberto Alberti in 1395, he originally wanted to marry another woman, and hoping to win her, he had forgone opportunities to marry into other prominent families. The woman's father, whose name was not divulged, promised that he would marry his daughter to Morelli and the alliance was affirmed by the ritual handclasp in Santa Croce. But before the sponsalitium took place, the father withdrew his promise. Still feeling rage at having been deceived and betrayed (tradimento ), Morelli related that "I have seen, and I still see", revenge (vendetta) inflicted on both the father and his family. Significantly, the inflicted revenge was metaphorical: the "grandissima grazia" (greatest blessing) of having married Caterina and his prosperous financial position were his "revenge". See GIOVANNI DI PAGOLO MORELLI, Ricordi, V. Branca (ed) (Florence 1956), pp. 342-343. 49 required the sponsus to consign the agreed-upon arrhae to the sponsa 51 . If he breached the betrothal, the sponsa would simply retain the earnest money. In the event the sponsa was the breaching party, she or her family was obligated to indemnify the sponsus with double, or quadruple, the amount she received from the sponsus 52 . The chief purpose of arrhae was to compel contractual performance by preventing a party from withdrawing from the betrothal contract with impunity. In contrast to the standard Roman law model, the Middle Ages saw the introduction of a consequential practice: the arrhae came to be simply promised, not given, by both parties. In the model betrothal contract included in the 1391 Florentine formulary of ser Iacopo Toschanelli (appendix 2), both parties affirm and acknowledge receipt of two hundred florins as arrhae, with the stipulation "that the violating and breaching party will give, pay and restore double this amount to the aggrieved party". The clause for the reciprocal and simultaneous exchange of arrhae had been a standard feature of Florentine and Tuscan betrothal contracts since at least the middle of the thirteenth century 53 . More importantly, it was a legal fiction, since obviously the parties did not exchange anything 54 . In Florence, the fictional exchange of the same amount of arrhae seems, at first glance, illogical. Yet, upon closer inspection the via fictionis taken by our merchant families was, in fact, an effective way of managing risk. Florentine merchant families -fearing loss of arrhae, no matter which party defaulted -were wary and often incapable of transferring large sums to another party. Nor was it feasible for them, even if they had the cash on hand, to tie up large amounts of capital that were indispensable for business undertakings. Just as the size of the dowry increased in the fifteenth century 55 , so did the amount of arrhae that was required to secure the performance of betrothals contracted by the wealthy and prominent. We were able to match sponsalia and dowry contracts of eight couples in the register of Francesco di Piero Giacomini cited above. In four cases, the amount of arrhae slightly exceeded the amount of the dowry , in three cases the amount was slightly lower, and in one case the amount was identical. By way of illustration, in a betrothal contracted between the Lipacci and Alessandri, the amount was 1 ,500 florins, while the corresponding dowry was 1,600 florins 56 . In the betrothal contracted between the Carocci and the 51 Needless to say, the father of the sponsus also could give the arrhae on behalf of his son. Though Roman legislation considered various possibilities -for instance, whether the sponsa was sui iuris and whether she had reached pubertyfor our purpose, part of this legislation is irrelevant, for, especially in the Middle Ages, it was the parents of the sponsus or sponasa who gave or promised the arrhae. The party failing to observe the terms of the contract was obligated "redere duplichatus" that amount to the aggrieved party. 54 Since the acknowledgment of arrhae was a fictitious transaction, we have chosen not to translate arrhae in this context as "earnest money" for this last term conveys the idea of an actual cash transfer from one party to the other. 55 Barucci, the amount was 800 hundred florins; the corresponding dowry 720 florins 57 . In a latefifteenth-century Florentine formulary, the exemplar arrhae were set at 1,000 florins 58 . To more fully appreciate the doctrinal context in which Angelus de Ubaldis rendered his two consilia , it is necessary to complement our brief account of arrhae sponsaliciae in Florence with a summary of the debate that erupted in the Middle Ages over the validity of attaching penalties to sponsalia contracts. From their Middle Eastern or Semitic origins to their incorporation into Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis, arrhae sponsaliciae have attracted considerable attention from historians of ancient and Roman law. Koschaker, Cornil, Volterra, Brandileone, and Astolfi have focused on the reception of arrhae by Roman society, the efforts of legislators to include them in the system of Roman law, and the subsequent legislative developments, including the legislation of the Eastern Empire 59 . Anné produced a nuanced study of their origins and diffusion, first in the eastern and then in the western part of the empire, and of the influence of Christianity on them 60 . In contrast to this profuse attention, arrhae under the ius commune remain a largely uncharted territory. For the Middle Ages we focus on a few broad issues gravitating around both doctrine and practice. From a theoretical point of view, one of the first issues jurists had to face was that of determining the differences between arrhae and a penalty. Next, especially in view of canon law, came the problem of the compatibility of arrhae with the sacred principle that marriage should be based on the free will and consent of the contracting parties. The custom of promising and acknowledging the fictitious receipt of substantial arrhae made the jurists examine not only whether the promise and acknowledgment of arrhae were legally valid, but also whether the amount should be limited to a token whose loss would be financially negligible. If, instead of a cash transfer, the arrhae consisted of a pledge (pignus), how should the pledge be construed in view of the imperial legislation on arrhae? With regard to the so-called Romano-canonical procedure, jurists had to face the question of what action could be granted to the aggrieved party when the sponsalia were unilaterally broken. The chief piece of legislation regulating the system of arrhae was l. Mulier (C. 5 .1.5) -a constitution originally promulgated by Emperor Leo in 472 and then inserted in the Codex 61 . Classic Roman law recognized that the stipulation of a penalty for the party who unilaterally withdraws from the sponsalia violates the customary principle of free marriage. While endorsing this principle, l. Mulier permitted arrhae and regulated their restitution 62 . Since both arrhae and a penal stipulation violate the principle of freedom of marriage, a coherent piece of legislation medievale", in Storia del matrimonio , M. De Giorgio and C. Klapisch-Zuber (edd) (Bari 1996), pp. 26-27. For the rough equivalence between dowry and arrhae, see The Society of Renaissance Florence: A Documentary History , G. Brucker (ed) (New York 1971), pp. 32-37, especially 36. In a marriage negotiation involving the Del Bene family, Lemmo Balducci, whose daughter was betrothed to Amerigo Del Bene, objected to setting the penalty for breaking the sponsalia at 2,000 florins. Among other reasons, the bride's father alleged that a penalty of 2,000 florins would spread the rumor that he had given a corresponding dowry ("ogni persona spererà ch'io dia di dota fiorini II M d'oro"). For the transcription of the original documents, see GENE A. BRUCKER, Firenze nel Rinascimento, translated by M. R. Bertelli (Florence 1980), pp. 253-257, for the citation, p. 256. For another example of the parity between arrhae and dowry, see the consilium of the fourteenth-century consultor, Andreas de Monte Ubbiano (=Monte Vibiano, a castello on a hilltop south of Perugia). Here, Corrado, father of the sponsa, promises to pay the sponsus a dowry worth 300 florins upon consummation of the marriage. In addition, Corrado acknowledges receipt of 300 florins in arrhae from the guardians of the sponsus, and in turn promises to pay the sponsus 600 florins (reddere duplicitas) if and when the sponsa does not fulfill the terms of the betrothal contract. The jurist determined that the guardians had not actually paid the arrhae (numeratio non probatur) and therefore had no claim against the sponsa. The consilium is located in the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria of Torino, Cod. H. I. 13 would require the prohib ition of both 63 . The inconsistent treatment to which arrhae and a penalty were subjected by imperial legislation became a conundrum for civil and canon lawyers in the Middle Ages. In c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), the locus classicus for discussing arrhae, Pope Gregory IX reiterated the principle of freedom of marriage and prohibited forcing an unwilling partner into marriage by the threat of a penal stipulation. In his decretal, the pope prohibited the future groom's father from extorting (extorsio) 64 an agreed-upon penalty from the future bride's mother (Gemma) on grounds that the marriage had not been contracted after the sponsalia had been made. The case and the papal response are patterned after l. Titia (D. 45.1.134). According to this fragment, where either spouse refuses marriage, a penal stipulation attached to the betrothal contract is i nvalidated, because the penalty runs counter to the commonly accepted standards of a community (boni mores) requiring that marriages, present and future, not be secured by the threat of a penalty 65 . The text of the decretal has nothing specific to say on arrhae, and sponsalia are mentioned as a fait accompli. Note that, even without papal intervention, a reason existed for invalidating the suit, as both the sponsus and sponsa had not yet reached the minimum legal age of seven years for contracting lawful sponsalia 66 . While the pope looked ahead to marriage, Bernardus of Parma in his gloss to c. Gemma looked back to sponsalia, asking whether or not arrhae are compatible with the principle of freedom of marriage. Torn between a theological principle and an institution sanctioned by Roman law, and compelled to take into account the custom of giving arrhae, his gloss is a conceptual jumble and amounts to little more than a convenient repository of opinions that could be useful to canonists 67 . "Attaching a penal stipulation to sponsalia", he wrote, "makes that stipulation invalid for the reason given in the text". Shifting to a series of Roman law texts, he went on, "arrhae given at sponsalia are lost, if the giving party withdraws without producing a just reason". "Since the reason 68 for giving the arrhae and establishing a penalty is the same", he observed without supplying the reason for treating them in the same fashion, "both should be subjected to the same prohibition". The two laws, civil and canon, were on a collision course. In an attempt to avoid the conflict, Bernardus sought another reading of arrhae: they may be understood as an incentive (res favorabilis) to marriage; penalties were not. Worse, penalties were hateful 69 . How Bernardus worked was immaterial; it mattered how he was understood. For civilian jurists, including Angelus de Ubaldis, the glossator, by treating arrhae as if they were a penalty, had 63 The prohibition of penalties should not be taken to mean that they were not attached de facto to betrothal contracts. At the end of the ninth century, Emperor Leo the Philosopher recognized the lawfulness of inserting a penal stipulation in a marriage contract. On his legislation on sponsalia, see G. FERRARI, "Diritto matrimoniale secondo le Novelle di Leone il filosofo", Byzantinische Zeitschrift, 18 (1909): 159-175. 64 The term extorsio aptly conveys the strong condemnation of the practice of exacting a penalty from the party in default. In 1517, the Florentine Synod reiterated the prohibition to attach any penalty to marriages and, in the same context, the bishops forbade people from acknowledging and promising arrhae. Moreover, in order that everybody would fully understand the content of the norms, the decrees related to marriage and sponsalia were published in vernacular. For the text, see MANSI, vol. 35, col. 252, Cap. IX: "Et il medesimo dichiarò haver luogo nelle arre promesse o confessate in fraude di detta pena". 65 D. 1.45.134: "Ex stipulatione, quae proponeretur, cum non secundum bonos mores interposita sit, agenti exceptionem doli mali obstaturam, quia inhonestum visum est vinculo poenae matrimonia obstringi sive futura sive iam contracta". 66 See, for instance, HOSTIENSIS to c. Gemma (X 4.1.29), (Venice 1581), fol. 9r, n. 1. For this canonist, the major issue (principale ) is the sponsalia, which were invalid because of the age of the two partners, and the accessorium is the penal stipulation, which violated the principle of freedom of marriage. If the main element is invalid, then a subsidiary one -the penal stipulation is all the more so. Though medieval canonists gave various reasons for invalidating the penal stipulation, they concurred that the pope grounded his decision in the sacred principle of freedom of marriage and suggested that in this case age was not a contentious issue. 67 Later canonists, for instance, Iohannes Andreae and Abbas Panormitanus, attempted to defend Bernardus's method, saying that he did not intend to give a solution (resolvere ) to the case, but only to present the legal arguments (allegare) that jurists may use in such a case. 68 For the principle "ubi eadem ratio ibi idem ius" that Bernardus applied to a penal stipulation and arrhae, see E. 72 . On grounds of l. Titia penalties are forbidden but arrhae are permitted. On grounds of l. Mulier, the party who gives the arrhae loses them if, because of the party's fault, the marriage is not contracted, while the party who receives them must return double or fourfold if likewise the marriage is not contracted. On grounds of l. Si quis 73 , if a pledge (pignus) is given, it should be treated like arrhae. On grounds of l. Si is qui and l. Saepe 74 , if within two years after the sponsalia marriage is not contracted, the dispositions on arrhae 75 become ineffective and the sponsa is free to marry another. Similarly, on grounds of l. Arrhis 76 , if marriage is prevented by the death of one of the parties, the dispositions on arrhae are inapplicable. On grounds of § Hoc quoque and § Sin vero 77 , the same applies if there is a lawful impediment to marriage 78 . It is no wonder that Bartolus counted Innocent IV among the nostri (civilian jurists) who recognized that a cardinal difference existed between arrhae and a penalty 79 . The equation Bernardus of Parma made between a penalty and arrhae, coupled with the canonists' suspicion of arrhae as a possible peril to the freedom of marriage, prompted both civil and canon lawyers to dwell on the difference between giving arrhae and promis ing to pay a penalty. Their task was not easy and, as Petrus de Bellapertica aptly noted, "jurists have their hands full" in searching for a convincing difference 80 . For Odofredus, the difference was plain: arrhae constituted a cash payment, distinguished from a penalty, which constitutes a promise to pay. When one promises to pay a penalty if the marriage is not contracted, the promisor has not drawn anything from his purse (non extrahit aliquid de marsupio). As Odofredus quipped, human beings are generous when handing out mere words. In a worst-case scenario, one would take a blind wife rather than pay the thousand pounds he promised on breach of contract, which was tantamount to forcing the promisor into a marriage he would not have otherwise contracted. Moreover, since in the case of arrhae only a small amount of money is disbursed to a mutual friend of the parties, it is unlikely that one would unwillingly contract marriage out of fear of losing it 81 . Iacopus de Arena also distinguished between a penalty that obligates one to give something, which is permitted, and a penalty that is merely stipulated, which is invalid. The reason behind the distinction is that "it is easier to make a promise [to pay] than to make an actual cash payment" 82 . Petrus de Bellapertica concurred and thought that the stipulation of magnae arrhae was invalid. Yet he allowed a significant exception to l. Titia . Instead of giving arrhae, kings may promise a substantial penalty, for the fear of a loss would not force these potentates into marriage 83 . In general, jurists recognized the essential difference between a stipulation consisting of words and a cash payment (facto bursali) 84 . Arguments about the validity of small amounts of arrhae were not entirely convincing, since any amount paid in case of withdrawal from the betrothal contract is after all the functional equivalent of a penalty. That civil and canon lawyers referred to arrhae as a "penalty" is an indication they realized that both were an obstacle to freedom of marriage. Canonists likewise found nothing in the body of decretals and canon law forbidding an aggrieved party from asking the counterpart to return double or fourfold the amount of arrhae 85 . In particular, for Hostiensis arrhae were tacitly allowed, a penalty explicitly forbidden. The reason to treat arrhae and a penalty differently was that arrhae are actually conveyed and upon conveyance one may make an agreement that the receiving party may retain them if marriage is celebrated 86 . But in a penal stipulation nothing is conveyed and, since there is no conveyance, no agreement may be made as to the penalty's disposition. Accordingly, in the case of a penalty, if marriage is contracted, there is no gain (lucrum) or hope of retaining something. If marriage is not contracted, there is the fear of having to restore the agreed-upon sum or the pledge to the aggrieved party. The arrhae serve as an amicable incentive to contract marriage; the penalty induces fear, which abolishes free consent (liber consensus). In a doubtful case, he held that the hope of a gain rather than the fear of a loss was the reason prompting the parties to enter into marriage. Yet Hostiensis thought that not only giving but also asking for the restitution of the arrhae was favorable (favorabilis) to marriage 87 . His ingenuous explanation works only if marriage follows the sponsalia, for then the law presumes that the parties are induced to contract marriage by the hope of a gain. Hostiensis's construction pleased neither Iohannes Andreae nor Antonius de Butrio. The fear of losing arrhae and the onerous restitution of double or fourfold the amount were obviously a penalty and an impediment to a free marriage. "I have seen", Andreae wrote, "arrhae of four thousand pounds". His solution, therefore, was to cut short legal speculation and fix arrhae to the social status of the persons contracting sponsalia (qualitas personarum). "Who doubts", he asked, "that it is an impediment to marriage if a poor person gives big arrhae". Since "gives" meant "promises", Andreae alleged that such a promise was invalid. Conversely , wealthy persons or magnates may stipulate a small penalty, for the loss would be negligible. Though 
; kings, nobles, and very rich people may be treated differently and allowed to stipulate a small penalty if a party broke the betrothal contract 89 . Abbas Panormitanus, too, approved of the two criteria (status and amount) proposed by Iohannes Andreae 90 . Canonists were willing to gloss over the prohibition of inserting any penalty, for they thought that a small penalty would not force a person with means into an unwanted marriage. The rationale of the law (ratio legis) was to safeguard the freedom of marriage; its literal interpretation (verba legis) was the prohibition of attaching a penal stipulation to a betrothal contract. For them, the ratio was preferable to the verba. In the end, neither civil nor canon lawyers succeeded in producing a persuasive analytical distinction between arrhae and a penalty. Toward the end of the fifteenth century the Milanese jurist Jason del Maino neatly summarized the impasse. He found that jurists had devised five basic reasons but, on close inspection, none of them was convincing 91 . The Florentine jurist Pietro Aldobrandini echoed him: "there is a big dispute among doctors on the differences ... and none of them is conclusive, if they can persuade at all" 92 . In short, jurists elaborated a distinction without difference, and that distinction could be supported only by persuasive, not convincing, reasons 93 . Despite the impasse, we can neither deny the jurists' efforts to establish a real difference nor accuse them of being mere nominalists. Roman law had bequeathed them an inconsistent set of norms and they had to make the best of it. Jurists required actual conveyance (traditio corporalis) of arrhae. The wording of l. Mulier made clear that the mere acknowledgment (confessio) was insufficient to ground a future claim. The expression "received" (accepit), which recurred several times in the fragment, meant that a thing had been actually conveyed to the other party. The term "to receive" was understood to signify reality (veritas) not fiction 94 . The standard formula regularly used in betrothal contracts, "I promise you that I will ensure that A will take B as his wife and, if I do not so, I promise one hundred as arrhae, which I acknowledge that I have received", was plainly invalid, for this was a promise to pay a penalty, and arrhae had to be actually transferred. Reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae between sponsus and sponsa was also invalid, Bartolus de Sassoferrato declared, for one acknowledgment caused the other and no actual payment occurred 95 . Yet a unilateral acknowledgment of arrhae was considered valid and sufficient, unless fraud was proved, on grounds that any confessio is prejudicial to the person who makes it but not to a third party 96 . 88 Probably Cynus de Pistorio. Antonius de Butrio and Niccolò dei Tedeschi, when reporting Iohannes Andreae's argument, cited Cynus, too. 89 IOHANNES ANDREAE to c. Gemma, fol. 13v, n. 9. Iohannes's suggestion presupposes the knowledge of the exemption Petrus de Bellapertica granted to kings -that is, upon contracting marriage they may promise a big penalty instead of arrhae. 90 Moreover, the reciprocal acknowledgment of any actual cash payment (numerata pecunia) made between the parties contracting sponsalia was considered a fraud 97 . For Baldus de Ubaldis, in a doubtful situation, the reciprocal acknowledgment was valid only if the parties renounced their right to raise an exceptio non numerate pecunie -that is, in court they would not object that the payment was not made 98 . Angelus de Ubaldis found an additional reason to distrust the reciprocal acknowledgment: the confessio occurred between two parties who by law are barred from making such a declaration 99 . In one of his opinions , Honofrius de Bartolinis of Perugia maintained that since the fictional exchange of arrhae was invalid, the aggrieved party had no basis for suing the breaching party 100 . Paulus de Castro granted that cases where both parties make a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae occurred daily, but the legal presumption was that the transaction was fraudulent, even if cash was actually transferred from one party to the other. That presumption that fraud existed was the advice he gave in one of his consilia. "To any persons endowed with discernment", he asserted, "it should occur that this [meaning Bartolus's view] is the sounder view" 101 . Canonists, too, sided with Bartolus. Abbas Panormitanus wrote that "On this matter, I have seen consilia against Bartolus, but I did not endorse them, for, then and now, I believe that his opinion is truer" 102 . The intricacies of a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae transferred figments of the court debate into the classroom. Suppose, Baldus told his students, "the sponsa acknowledges a hundred as arrhae and the sponsus does the same". "You answer", he went on, "that obviously nothing has been received" 103 . But for the jurist things were not as they appeared at first sight. "If I give you a hundred as a loan", he argued, "and you give me a hundred as a loan, there are undoubtedly two loans. Here we have two contracts and two causes" 104 . It was like the case of a donation made in anticipation of future marriage (donatio propter nuptias) and the dowry. Though according to ius commune the amount of both must be the same they may not be confused 105 . Again, Baldus asked, "suppose that two parties reciprocally acknowledge that they have received a hundred for the sponsalia and then one party withdraws. What is the effect of this transaction"? For the jurist, the party in default may be summoned on grounds of having given arrhae but not on their acknowledgment. Once in court, the defendant argues, "I compensate you by losing the hundred I gave, as it appear s from the acknowledgment". The other party replies, "You lost those hundred because you withdrew from the sponsalia. And you deserve a double penalty. Because of the reciprocal giving of the arrhae, you lose what you gave and must return double of what you received". Baldus called attention to this case, for questions of this kind were raised time and again 106 . The "reply " of the aggrieved party shows how risky the reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae in cash was. The question whether or not a double penalty -that is, the loss of the given arrhae and the obligation to return double or fourfold the received arrhae -may be imposed in the case of a reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae attracted the attention of speculative jurists 107 . The increase of the amount of arrhae also preoccupied the jurists. The most sustained and coherent effort to reduce them to a "token" was made by Bartolus. He started with the presumption that sponsalia and matrimonium do not have the same importance. Consequently, the penalty imposed for unilaterally withdrawing from a marriage should not be the same as the one for withdrawing from sponsalia. The established penalty for breaking up a marriage was the loss of the dowry and the gifts given in anticipation of marriage (donatio propter nuptias). No penalty was imposed for withdrawing from sponsalia where the arrhae had not yet been given. If they had been given, the penalty was that established by l. Mulier. "It is an absurdity ", he argued, "if the law penalizes more severely the breaking of sponsalia than matrimonium". Hence, the amount of arrhae ought not to exceed that of the dowry or the gifts given in anticipation of marriage, which, as we have noted above, sometimes occurred 108 . Dissenting, Angelus pointed out that Bartolus's argument was unacceptable, for Roman law did not establish any limit on the amount of arrhae 109 . Though Bartolus's opinion remained isolated, jurists agreed that an actual cash payment could be the effective way to stop the inflation of arrhae: any person can make a big promise but things change drastically when one has to spend money from his or her purse. Sometimes arrhae were constituted as a pledge (pignus), such as an immovable, like a house or a piece of land, or a movable, like jewelry 110 . In case of default, what were the rules for the restitution of a pledge, and was one bound to restore double or fourfold? Among medieval jurists these questions became the object of dissenting opinions 111 , especially between Bartolus and his student, Baldus. Bartolus asked: "What is the law if I give you a piece of land as arrhae and appoint myself as its owner on your behalf"? Done in this form, the transaction is invalid, for actual conveyance of the property is required, just as in the case of money 112 . Furthermore, he asserted that when a piece of land or an individual thing (species) is given, the dispositions of l. Mulier do not apply for the text spoke of things that can be doubled or quadrupled. A sum of money or, more precisely, its numerical equivalent can be doubled or quadrupled; an object in itself, never 113 . Though movables and immovables have a value, this aspect was immaterial for the jurist, because it was the object 107 110 The question whether instead of cash a pledge may be given, which was of paramount importance in a society with limited availability of cash, was addressed by Accursius in his gloss Matrimonia to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134). He admitted that a pledge may be given instead of the arrhae, but not as a penalty. 111 As Albericus de Rosate pointed out, the use of the term pignus itself is not without problems. Since a pignus was given so that it would remain with the receiver, except where marriage is not contracted, calling it pignus contradicts the definition given in the title itself that constituted the pledge 114 . Baldus strongly dissented. "Suppose that not cash but a movable or immovable is given as arrhae", he asked, "does the penalty of the double or fourfold apply "? Pledges given as arrhae, being quantifiable, increase (crescunt in certo corpore) 115 . When money is given as a pledge, money is traded not as a genus but as a fixed thing, and pledges exist not as a genus but as a fixed thing 116 . "Supposing that Bartolus's view is true", Baldus went on, "in a sum given as a species there is no duplication, which is false". When considered as an object or individual body, a sum of money cannot be multiplied. Yet its value (estimatio) may be doubled. "On this point", he concluded, "my master (doctor meus) was wrong" 117 . Baldus's reductionistic approach was not entirely convincing. His brother Angelus, endorsing Bartolus's view, stated that things that cannot be doubled or quadrupled fell outside the purview of l. Mulier 118 . Paulus de Castro, on the other hand, qualified Bartolus's view. If Bartolus thought that one giving an individual thing as arrhae might not lose it where the marriage was not contracted owing to the fault of the giver, he was wrong, because the loss of the thing applied to both quantity and the individual thing itself. If he thought that the person receiving the pledge was bound to return the thing itself rather than double its value, if he or she withdrew from the marriage, Bartolus's opinion is plausible (habet colorem) 119 . Yet Paulus was forced to admit that individual things can be quantified. Canonists, too, admitted that a pignus was a difficulty-ridden issue around which contrasting opinions swirled. Abbas Panormitanus, following Bartolus, accepted the view that a pledge cannot be multiplied. If so, it could not be treated like arrhae, which could be doubled, tripled, or quadrupled. Furthermore, l. Mulier did not contemplate the case of a pledge, but only the transfer of money from one party to another. Accordingly, pledges could not be used, unless their value was supplemented in case of default (pro interesse prestando) 120 . Women in Italy today who, upon breaking their engagement, opt to keep the engagement ring and restore its monetary value, while welcoming Baldus's opinion, would nonetheless be receptive to Bartolus's insight into the uniqueness and symbolic value of things. Without examining a large sample of notarial sponsalia, it remains difficult to assess how frequently pledges were used. Indirect evidence that they were used can be gleaned form the commentaries of jurists and model notarial sponsalia contracts. Odofredus reported that upon contracting sponsalia giving pledges to a commonly trusted friend was a Bolognese custom 121 . This custom bears a resemblance to Jewish customs, which required the betrothing parties to consign equivalent amounts of earnest money to a third party. Upon breach of contract, the earnest money would be duly conveyed to the nonbreaching party 122 . Moreover, according to Odofredus, canon lawyers counseled people to give pledges instead of arrhae 123 . For other jurists, there were no basic objections to giving pledges, provided that they were in fact transferred, not just promised 124 . After all, since Roman law did not prohibit them; they were allowed 125 . Among the notaries, Rolandinus furnished a model sponsalium contract in which arrhae consisted of a house and a piece of land. He also explained why and when the parties opted for immovables or cash. If the interval between sponsalia and marriage was long, the parties opted for immovables such as land or houses. If the two events were close in time, the parties opted for cash. But in an explanatory note to his Ars notarie, the author qualified this view as a "personal view, not a necessary one" (voluntarium dictum non autem necessarium) and asserted that the parties could not be forced to choose a particular option 126 . In contrast to the dowry, where an action (actio rei uxorie) for the recovery of the dowry lay against the husband, Roman law did not grant any specific action to enforce a penal stipulation attached to sponsalia 127 . The rules regulating arrhae probably sufficed. The progressive importance sponsalia assumed in the Middle Ages stirred jurists to consider the question of whether an action for breach of a promise to marry may be granted. Their quest faced an insurmountable obstacle in l. Mulier, which prohibited inserting any penal stipulation, except the arrhae, in sponsalia contracts, since no one could enter marriage under the threat of penalty. Azo searched the Corpus iuris for an answer to the question, but in the end was forced to admit: "I cannot find one" -thereby indicating that Roman law did not recognize a specific action in cases of broken betrothal promises 128 . Accursius thought that an action ad interesse -that is, for damagemight be granted to the aggrieved party 129 . While leaning toward Azo's view, Odofredus thought that Accursius's concession required qualifications. Ordinarily, an action ad interesse was out of the question, for it was tantamount to stipulating a penalty. But there was one exception to withholding the actio ad interesse: when a poor young man contracts sponsalia with a rich widow and she refuses to marry him, he may sue for interesse 130 . Petrus de Bellapertica flatly rejected Accursius's view. If an action is granted, he stated, "marriages would be contracted on the basis of interesse". Just as stipulating a penalty was forbidden, so granting an action ad interesse amounted to allowing the parties do in one way what was forbidden by another 131 . Dynus de Musiello made the telling distinction between an action directed at recovering lucrum and an action directed at recovering damnum 132 . An action for the recovery of any loss directly resulting from the broken promise was not a penalty but a rei persecutio -an action by which a thing is sued for. An action aiming at a future gain (lucrum), or the future advantages marriage might have brought to a party, is prohibited, on the grounds that the marriage was not yet contracted and granting the action would be comparable to a penalty. The challenge medieval jurists faced was aptly presented by Cynus de Pistorio. Granting an unqualified action ad interesse, as Accursius thought, meant that an action for a penalty was available to the aggrieved party, which was forbidden by l. Mulier. At the same time, it was difficult for a jurist to think that a stipulation bereft of force could exist, as such a stipulation was utterly useless. But the truth was that an unenforceable stipulation indeed existed, because by law a penal stipulation in sponsalia contracts worked only with regard to the arrhae 133 . The distinction between a future lucrum and a past damnum enabled jurists to overcome the impasse 134 . Canon lawyers, as well, accepted the distinction and recognized that the aggrieved party could bring an action to recover the loss 135 . The always-imaginative Baldus recast the debate. Suppose that there are two sponsae, one rich and the other richer, and both are willing to contract sponsalia with me by words of future consent. I choose the richer, who promises me thousands as interesse in the event she fails to marry me because of the loss I suffer for not marring the rich one. May the aggrieved party legitimately bring an action ad interesse? Baldus proposed that if the promise reflects an actual loss suffered, the sponsus can bring an action for compensation, where, for instance, he expended a great amount of money in preparation for the impending marriage. If the promise reflects a future gain conditional on the marriage, the sponsus cannot bring any action, since that would be a condition forcing one into marriage. An action claiming that the richer party had committed fraud (dolus) was also available to the sponsus. But if an agreement violated the ethical standards of a community (boni mores), as in sponsalia carrying a penal stipulation, one who disregards it does not incur dolus. A finer distinction was needed. Clearly, if the agreement is construed as a penalty, it has no validity. If, on the other hand, the agreement is construed as true interesse, it is considered just and reasonable and does not violate the ethical standards of the community. Its purpose, Baldus asserted, was not "ad impediendum matrimonium" but "ad impediendum calumniam" -that is, to prevent dishonor. With an eye to practice, he advised against construing interesse in a formalistic way or in strict accordance with the agreement and in favor of proving its validity in court by presumptive evidence (verisimiles coniecturas). The grounds for suing for interesse did not rest on the unwillingness to contract marriage but on the agreement and the damage one suffered because the other party broke the agreement without legitimate cause 136 . Baldus's doctrine stressed the need to penalize the party whose breach of the sponsalia served to humiliate and shame the jilted party. The breaching party was not only liable for causing damages, but also incurred infamia. The action ad interesse was the basis on which ecclesiastical courts in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries compelled the breaching party to compensate the jilted party for expenditures made in connection with the marriage and litigation. The action ad interesse remains behind the articuli of Italy's Codice Civile of 1865 and the present Codice, which grant an action to the aggrieved party to sue for the recovery of the expenditures in preparation of marriage (see below, 000). It also remains behind the Japanese Civil Code, which leaves to custom the field of engagement (konyaku) but allows a party to recover the gifts (e.g., rings and expensive items) given in anticipation of marriage. In contrast, the French Civil Code ignores altogether the "promise of marriage" and protects the party who suffers loss because of an unjustified breach of the sponsalia by granting an action grounded in Aquilian responsibility. It has been pointed out that this approach opens the way to suing for unreasonable damages.
Preceptum Guarentigie
Under Florentine law, the obligation to pay even large sums of arrhae was enforceable and served as an effective deterrent. Since the early thirteenth century, Florentines and other Tuscans had placed their confidence in the summary procedure known as preceptum guarentigie to compel the defaulting party to pay arrhae. As Briegleb and Campitelli have remarked, this popular procedure, which derived from Germanic law, was used to compel the timely payment of debt obligations in myriad commercial and credit contracts without undergoing time-consuming court proceedings 137 .
Municipal statutes sanctioned this institution and made it into a powerful tool in the hands of merchants and bankers. Widely utilized, it was attached to contracts and transactions to ensure the prompt execution of the clauses therein contained, including the payment of arrhae. The procedure worked as follows. The parties acknowledged to a public notary that they willingly submitted to summary procedure, and their acknowledgment was duly inserted in the contract. In effect, they promised, as if in a court of law, to accept full liability in the event of any future breach of contract they might commit. Further, they simultaneously agreed to waive their right to contest the entry of judgment ordering them to pay the arrhae. In a betrothal contract the breaching party was treated as the debtor, who had to indemnify the damaged party, the creditor. What the parties wished to accomplish with such betrothal contracts containing a preceptum guarentigiatum is aptly described by Odofredus. "Everyday citizens of this city (Bologna) and of all the world", he stated, come to a jurist wishing that "one's son would contract sponsalia with the daughter of another. And both children are minors". The parties, then, ask the jurist "to make the sponsalia between my son and the other party 's daughter and bind us in such a way that we cannot withdraw from the contract with impunity". He advised his students to avoid such arrangements and forthwith to explain to the parties that their wishes could not be executed, because the insertion of a penal stipulation in a betrothal contract violates the principle of the freedom of marriage. Yet, if the parties persisted, Odofredus offered a solution: in contrast to the canonists "we, the civilian jurists, handle the situation in the following way" 138 . He recommended arrhae, to which an oath could be added, as it was "customary in Pisa and all Tuscany ", as an effective legal device for binding the parties in such a way that neither one could break the carefully planned strategic alliance between the two families 139 . A century later, Baldus continued to refer to the widespread custom confirming the (fictitious) acknowledgment of arrhae and to the statutes sanctioning that custom by making available to the parties the preceptum guarentigie 140 .
Consilia
In truth, the large majority of notarized Florentine betrothals, propelled forward by social pressures, and the prospect of losing arrhae, culminated in marriages. Where marriage did not follow, the death of a party or other uncontrollable circumstances were usually responsible. Still, a small, and probably unquantifiable, number of cases involving alleged breaches of notarized betrothal contracts were adjudicated in the court of the podestà. At issue was the operation of the preceptum guarentigie and payment of arrhae. Given the jumble of conflicting rules on betrothals, civil law judges and litigants routinely asked local jurists to present consilia addressing and resolving the issues of fact and law that had caused the dispute. We examine two such consilia composed by Angelus de Ubaldis, which we have edited and included in appendix 3. From internal evidence, it is almost certain that the two consilia were rendered during the period when Angelus was teaching at the University of Florence from 1387/88 until the beginning of October 1391, when he left to teach at Bologna 141 . In 1398/99, he resumed his chair in Florence, where he taught until quaestiones civilistiche disputate nelle università medievali, M. Bellomo (ed) (Catania 1980), pp. 57-96. For many examples of disputes over contracts carrying the preceptum guarentigiatum, see M. CHIANTINI, Il consilium sapientis nel processo del secolo XIII: San Gimignano 1246-1312 (Siena 1996). 138 ODOFREDUS to l. Alii desponsata (C. 5.1.1), fol. 262v, n. 2. 139 Adding an oath to the sponsalia was more problematic; see ODOFREDUS to l. Titia (D. 45.1.134), fol. 136v, n. 4; and to l. Alii desponsata, fol. 262v, n. 2. Bartolus also agreed that an oath could not be introduced to validate the will of the parties, when the betrothal contract could not be redacted within the parameters of law. See his commentary to l. Titia, vol. 6, fol. 56r, n. 11: "Quero an in predictis casibus, ubi de iure non valet, potest firmari iuramento? Respondeo: non". 142 .
Consilium I
The facts provided in the punctus, along with the terms of the sponsalium, which both notaries and jurists knew by heart, were, as a matter of course, abbreviated. Male and female ascendants of two families promised each other to see and ensure (facturos et curaturos) that the son of one would take as his wife the daughter of the other. Since the instrument was a sponsalium, it is obvious that the sponsus and sponsa were more than seven years old but had not yet reached the canonical age for contracting a legally valid marriage. In the same instrument of betrothal the parties reciprocally acknowledged that they had received a thousand florins as arrhae with the understanding that, in the case one of them failed to fulfill the terms of the contract, the breaching party would return to the aggrieved party double the amount of arrhae. It happened that one party unilaterally broke the contract. The aggrieved party sued for the simple amount of arrhae. Since the parties had attached a preceptum guarentigiatum to the contract, the court official who drafted the punctus also transcribed part of the relevant rubric of the Florentine statutes on the preceptum guarentigiatum. The punctus ends with the question of whether or not the preceptum guarentigiatum is enforceable. We are left in the dark about the precise ages of the sponsus and sponsa, the names of their families, the reason for breaking the contract and who broke it, and why the aggrieved party sued only for the simple amount of arrhae and not double, as originally stipulated. The court official was obviously puzzled, too, because the reciprocal stipulation on arrhae was inserted in the instrument. Was that Florentine practice? Did the reciprocal acknowledgment mean that both parties had exchanged a thousand florins or had deposited them with a trusted person? Or was the reciprocal acknowledgement a mere promise to pay a penalty in the event a party breached the contract? The skeletal outline of the punctus and the lack of information were no obstacle to Angelus, an expert on disputes in which the competence of civil law, canon law, and statutory dispositions overlapped. The structure of the opinion follows the pattern of arguments pro-etcontra. Judging from the style of the argumentation, we regard it as a consilium sapientis, an impartial opinion commissioned by the court, not an opinion written at the request and on behalf of one of the parties. The technical question on enforceability did not at all prevent Angelus from casting his net wider than the immediate issue of whether or not one party should be compelled to pay a thousand florins. Theoretically, the preceptum guarentigiatum could be attached to a stipulation for performing acts prosecutable under criminal law -for example, hiring someone to commit homicide or steal, or to commit a sinful and immoral act like sacrilege. Since municipal legislation made the preceptum unconditionally executable, was it enforceable even in the case of an immoral act or a crime? And, if not, why? In view of the principle upholding the freedom of marriage, are arrhae permitted, or should they be treated as a penalty? Lastly, what distinguishes arrhae from a penalty 143 ?
"At first sight", Angelus began, "it seems that the said instrument containing a preceptum guarentigiatum deserves no implementation at all, for the contract violates the commonly accepted standards of a community (boni mores) requiring that present and future marriages not be secured by the fetters of a penalty". More generally, all contracts and agreements violating the accepted community standards have no force, do not entitle either party to bring an action or raise an exception, and do not create even a natural obligation 144 . Such agreements may not be secured by taking an oath. In short, the standard doctrine on agreements, by which any agreement involving illegal and immoral matters was voided by law, made the betrothal contract invalid and unenforceable 145 . Next, Angelus considered an objection grounded in the unconditional enforceability of instruments containing a preceptum guarentigiatum. On details, one may argue that, since the statute aimed at expediting the payment of debts, a betrothal contract falls outside the statutory dispositions. More substantially, a rigid application of the statute produces absurd consequences. Paradoxically, if the preceptum is attached to a contract, no matter how shameful and wrong its content may be, it follows that the contract must be implemented. Perversely , marriages between ascendants and descendants would be permissib le, a sacrilege or a crime would be allowed, and detestable deeds would be performed, as they were all secured by the preceptum. But this was an absurdity violating divine and human law, as well as canon and civil law. A literal interpretation and application of the statute would lead to impermissible consequences 146 . Reversing course, Angelus now argued in favor of enforcing the betrothal instrument. He conceded that, as matter of general principle, attaching a penal stipulation to a betrothal or marriage contract is prohibited by civil and canon law alike. Yet, "though we may call arrhae a penalty, nonetheless they do not have the same effect as a penalty ". What distinguished arrhae and a penalty was "the reason for which arrhae were not given" -that is, they were not given as a penalty. If they had the same effect, arrhae would have been prohibited by canon and civil law. But civil law established that arrhae could be lawfully retained when, by fault of the giving party , marriage was not contracted, whereas they must be restored, doubled or quadrupled, when the receiving party was at fault. In contrast to Roman law, however, Angelus held that the breaching recipient was responsible for returning double, not quadruple, the amount of arrhae 147 . Adhering to mainstream doctrine, Angelus stressed that the reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae made in the same instrument was invalid. Yet its invalidity could not be raised as an exception, for the statute on the preceptum forbade ipso iure the defendant from presenting any exception whatsoever. "There are many deeds", he insisted, "that are utterly invalid by law; nonetheless, their nullity may not be produced, for the statute or municipal legislation shuts the mouth of one who wishes to allege their nullity". Similarly, the statutes may prohibit the judge from hearing such defenses. Municipal legislation enacted against the magnates and the dispositions on contumacy was a case in point. If a statute establishing that one may not be heard in court is valid, "it becomes invalid when worded in the following way: that justice should be denied to one person, for in this case it would be in violation of the law of God" 148 . Now, Angelus answered the objections. To the argument that a preceptum attached to an agreement may validate any deed, such as marrying an ascendant or descendant, permitting marriage within prohibited degrees, or perpetrating a crime, he readily acknowledged that immoral deeds are forbidden by all the laws. In these instances the laws deny tout court the capacity of persons to enter into such immoral agreements. Yet there are deeds "in conflict with the commonly accepted standards of a community", he went on, "only because of a civil law disposition". Where conflict between deed and norm arises because of a civil law disposition, municipal statutes may be enacted contrary to civil law standards. In short, practices that are not in conformity with the ius commune may be permitted solely on the basis of the authority of municipal statutes. The logical conclusion was that the instrument on the reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae must be enforced regarding the simple amount. Even the doubts the court had entertained on the proper form of the notarial instrument served as an additional argument supporting Angelus's main thesis. If the wording of the instrument conformed to Florentine notarial practice, it was valid and must be enforced. Different communities have different customs and standards, and notarial practice, as one would expect, reflects local customs. Consequently, one has to follow local customs, for where the conflict is between two customs, there is no compelling reason to prefer one over the other. This case reveals that Florentine practices of betrothal among upper-level families were an exercise in risk management. Legal devices -such as the high amount of arrhae, their reciprocal acknowledgment without actual transfer of cash, and the attachment of a preceptum guarentigiatum to the betrothal contract -bound the two families with an ironclad contract, and, if no impediment occurred between betrothal and marriage, the alliance was secured. Though we do not now how the court ruled, Angelus's consilium underscored the high risks involved in the Florentine strategic management of betrothal contracts. At the end of Trecento, a loss of a thousand florins was a substantial amount, as one can surmise from the amount of the dowries we have cited above. It comes as no surprise that jurists insisted on the actual transfer of money for a valid stipulation on arrhe to avoid an unhappy outcome in which the breaching party became a victim of his or her own fiction 149 .
Consilium II
The facts of the second case centered on an agreement concluded between lady Massina, with the consent of her guardian (mundualdus) 150 , and Eusepio on the future betrothal and marriage of their minor children. Under the agreement, Massina's daughter, Sera, immediately after the month of February, 1390, upon the completion of her twelfth birthday, would consent to take Pellegrino, Eusepio's son, as her lawful spouse and husband (sponsum et virum legitimum). Next, Sera would contract lawful marriage with Pellegrino and accept from him wedding rings. Massina herself would pay Pellegrino Sera's dowry, a certain amount consisting of cash and things. It was stipulated that Sera and Massina would fulfill all these promises at a future time and in a way that would be decided by the arbiters, a certain Antonio and Lorenzo, selected by both parties. More specifically, it was left to the arbiters to fix the dates of betrothal and marriage, the exact amount and composition of the dowry, and the method of payment. For his part, Eusepio promised that Pellegrino, immediately after the month of May, 1391, upon the completion of his fourteenth birthday, would reciprocate Sera's consent to their betrothal and marriage 151 . 149 Angelus's consilium did not go unnoticed, and his passing note on the invalidity of reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae was cited, for instance, by JASON DEL MAINO to l. Titia (D. 45 151 For another Florentine betrothal contract closely resembling that between Massina and Eusepio, see MARIANUS SOCINUS, Consilia, vol. I, fol. 3r. In the case on which the Senese jurist was asked to give his opinion, both the sponsus and sponsa were younger than the required minimum of seven years; the dowry was set at eight hundred florins and the arrhae at five hundred; both parties reciprocally acknowledged the receipt of the arrhae; and the standard preceptum guarentigiatum was added to the contract. Sozzini advised that, despite the insertion of the preceptum guarentigiatum, the breaching party was not obligated to return double the amount of the arrhae, since the contract was utterly invalid owing to the ages of the sponsus and sponsa.
The abbreviated format of the punctus, however, leaves us in the dark regarding the social identity of the parties and the place where the agreement and dispute took place. Although Massina was not identified as a widow, it is almost certain that she was, for her husband was duty bound to marry off his filia familias, which he would have done had he been alive. The omission of surnames, which was usually done for the sake of brevity, prevents us from gauging the contracting parties' social standing. In the absence of toponymic surnames or any mention of place, we cannot be certain that the parties were Florentine or that the dispute occurred in Florence. Nor can we say with certainty whether consilium II was solicited by the court or one of the parties to bolster its case. It is apparent from Angelus's consilium that the dispute occurred in Tuscany, but not necessarily in Florence. Similarly, the presence of a mundualdus, a Florentine institution, with dates in Florentine style (ab incarnatione), were practices shared by nearby communities in the contado, distretto, and other parts of Tuscany. If not definitive, Angelus's linking of consilium II with consilium I, discussed above, is yet another piece of indirect evidence suggesting that the case was being litigated in a court under the jurisdiction of Florence and subject to its statutes. To avoid confusion, it should be remembered that in Florence the new year began on March 25 th , the day of the feast of the Annunciation, making Pellegrino's fourteenth birthday fall in May 1391, rather than May 1390, in accordance with the solar calendar, in which the new year begins on the first of January. The salient point here is that, based on the facts provided in the punctus, Pellegrino would have reached the legal age for marriage only two months after Sera had completed her twelfth birthday, rather than fourteen months later. In his consilium, however, Angelus never used the expression ab incarnatione 152 ; he used only anno domini, which referred to the solar calendar. Inexplicably, perhaps unconsciously, and we believe in error, Angelus seemed to have reverted to the solar calendar of his native city, Perugia. In Angelus's reckoning, or as he said, according to the facts furnished him, Pellegrino was fourteen months older than Sera. It may be objected that Angelus had not erred, because he also used the expression recte calculo computato, together with anno domini, thus calling attention to a subtler way of counting year s. Yet, in context, the expression meant "counting more precisely", that is, counting down to the months. Consilium II opened with a reaffirmation of consilium I: "Just as I advised in the above-mentioned case", Angelus declared, "so likewise here I approv e once more all that is stated in the above consilium and affirm that it was consonant with the law and well advised". Angelus's reaffirmation suggests that the judge who commissioned consilium II may have been familiar with consilium I and the case which it addressed. If so, the reaffirmation released Angelus from repeating or summarizing the tenor of the earlier consilium. It is also conceivable that Angelus felt that the reaffirmation was necessary to forestall any inference that his opinion in the present case contradicted consilium I. The present case differed from the earlier one in that here one of the arbiters had died before declaring the date on which the marriage was to occur, therefore terminating the agreement. The arbiter's premature death, however, did not discourage Pellegrino's father from formally notifying Massina, immediately after Sera's twelfth birthday in February, that the time for marriage was at hand or had passed. Formal notification was necessary when the date for fulfilling an obligation was uncertain, thus placing the other party in default. The concrete issue Angelus was asked to resolve was whether Massina and Sera had broken the betrothal contract. Angelus responded: "At that time, unless fraud had altered his age, Pellegrino was incapable of contracting marriage, although he could enter into a contract of betrothal (sponsalium)" 153 . While this was technically true, the two-step sequence, betrothal followed by marriage, was not stipulated in the contract. The convoluted wording of the contract, as Angelus construed it, stipulated that the betrothal, the ringing of the bride, and the marriage would all take place at the same time:
The agreement was conceived as follows -namely, that the said girl will consent to take Pellegrino as her lawful spouse and husband; and that she will accept from him wedding rings; and that she will contract lawful marriage with him. Therefore, the words, "spouse" [sponsus] and "husband" [vir] are interchangeable, as is customary among the Tuscans, for whom women are espoused by having rings placed on their fingers [subharatio] . For then, reciprocally and in mutual agreement, one to the other and vice versa, the bridegroom [desponsans] gives his consent to the bride [desponsatam] to take her as his lawful spouse [sponsa] and wife [uxor] . And she gives her consent to the bridegroom to take him as her spouse and husband. And then, as is customary, the notary will ask the bride if she consents to take him as her spouse and husband. Likewise, the husband is asked if he consents to take her as his lawful spouse and wife, and both answer that they will. Therefore, the parties to this agreement did not intend that betrothal should occur first and marriage afterwards, but that both should occur at the same time. However, since betrothal and marriage could not happen, as a matter of law, default was not incurred.
Angelo's foregrounding of the temporal unity of Tuscan betrothal and marriage rites was roughly consistent with practice, for, as we have observed, the betrothal and marriage of a couple on the same day did occur in late Trecento Florence. Next, Angelus pronounced that on grammatical grounds the clauses in the agreement supported his argument that Massina and Sera would not have to fulfill their obligations until after the month of May, when Pellegrino would be legally capable of contracting a present-consent marriage. He concluded that it was impossible for default to have occurred, since the time for contracting marriage had not been declared by the arbiters: "If, therefore, the time for contracting the marriage, paying the dowry, and determining its amount, as well as the means by which all this should be carried out, were unconditionally placed at the discretion of the arbiters, there can be no default whatsoever before a declaration is made by the said arbiters concerning the time when and the means by which all this should be carried out, provided the facts are as they were disclosed to me". Finally, under a bilateral contract carrying reciprocal obligations, as in this case, the defendant cannot be placed in default unless the plaintiff first fulfills his obligations. Since it was legally impossible for Eusepio and Pellegrino to fulfill their own contractual obligations, there were no legal grounds for suing Massina and Sera for nonperformance. We have no idea what motivated Massina to withdraw from the contract after the arbiter's death. Perhaps she had found a better match for her daughter. Whatever the motives, it seems that in contrast to the first case, the parties resorted neither to the fictitious acknowledgment of arrhae nor to the preceptum guarentigiatum to cement the contract. Again, in the first case, the sponsalia had been unilaterally broken, and the issue was whether the agreed-upon penalty could be lawfully imposed, whereas in the second the issue was whether Massina's decision itself constituted a breach of contract. In consilium II, Angelus rehearsed, but then moved beyond, timehonored doctrines regarding the differences between sponsalia a nd matrimonium and the invalidity of marriage vows owing to an impediment of nonage. As in consilium I, he accented the wishes of the parties as instantiated in their mutual agreements and the constitutive role of municipal law and local customs in the construction and the operation of betrothal contracts.
translates the technical expression "in eam aetatem malitia non suppleret" as "difettava di quella malitia che in qualche modo avrebbe potuto compensare la sua minore età". In view of canons c. De illis (X. 4.2.9) and c. Tue nobis (X. 4.2.14), and the glosses Nubilis e Prudentia, the term malitia may be understood as vigor naturalis and potentia coeundi -in short, physical capacity to have sexual intercourse. For this meaning, see Iohannes Andreae ad c. De illis (X. 4.2.9), fol. 18v, n. 3. How the therm malitia -which in post-classical Latin also means unfruitfulnes or barreness, as in the expression terrae malitia or malitia arboris -came to used in this way requires further investigation.
Highlights and Contrasts
Our study is the first to highlight the interplay of Roman and canon law jurisprudence, together with municipal law and local customs, in making and breaking betrothal contracts. Although notarial manuals regularly featured model contracts of sponsalia, our preliminary archival research suggests that betrothal contracts were few and far between. No doubt, upper-level families, as in Florence, relied on betrothal contracts for arranging the future marriage of minor children, when the interval between betrothal and marriage might be a year or longer. Florentine betrothal contracts attest to the strategic competence of Florentine families to contract alliances from which neither party could withdraw with impunity 154 . The cases we have discussed, along with the novelle, point to the instrumental role that widows played in arranging betrothals and marriages. Arrhae were one of the devices employed to construct an ironclad contract. Although arrhae were necessary, they proved insufficient, so that an oath and the preceptum guarentigiatum were required, as well, to ensure performance. The prohibitive risks attached to betrothal instruments surely discouraged commoners from employing them. Above all, the short intervals between betrothals and subsequent marriages inhibited the widespread use of notarized sponsalia contracts. The process of identifying the crucial differences between arrhae and a penalty was laborious, and the distinguishing traits, as elaborated by the jurists, were ultimately problematic. Similarly, the custom of giving a pledge (pignus) instead of cash posed a dilemma: should the value of the object pledged be treated symbolically or materially? While in the second case the pledge may be considered as an equivalent of arrhae given in cash, in the first it may not and thus it falls outside the dispositions of l. Mulier on arrhae. Additionally, the reciprocal exchange and acknowledgment of arrhae called into question the neatly devised system medieval jurists inherited from Roman law. Nonetheless, jurists succeeded in unmasking frauds, especially in the form of the fictitious and reciprocal acknowledgment of arrhae. Since the value of arrhae corresponded approximately to that of dowries, the jurists failed in their attempt to limit arrhae to a small amount of cash actually transferred from one party to another. Of long-lasting significance was the jurists' effective defense of an aggrieved party's ability to mount an action ad interesse against the breaching party in order to recover expenditures made in anticipation of marriage. The multiple and varied and sources of law of the late Middle Ages constituted a socio-legal reality far removed from contemporary regulations governing premarital procedures across Europe and the United States 155 . Today, civil law regulations are almost always based on the monopoly of codes and statutes uniformly applied within the jurisdiction of each country and within each of the fifty U. S. states. Depending on the domicile of the parties, compulsory premarital procedures in Europe and the United States usually consist of premarital counseling, attestation of residence, the production of a birth, divorce, or death certificates (of a former spouse), and the procurement of a marriage license. In Italy, notice of the future marriage must be posted for a minimum of eight days in the town hall of the locality where the couple resides in order to allow interested parties to raise impediments. In addition, all civ il marriages must be recorded in a public registry 156 . These compulsory procedures were introduced by governments over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries for the purpose of regularizing and controlling the formation of marriage. One important result of these procedures is that present-day suits resulting from both broken promises to marry and divorce largely concern claims over property, rather than challenges to the validity of the marriage itself. By contrast, the ease by which betrothals and marriages were contracted in the late Middle Ages inevitably resulted in myriad disputes over the very validity of betrothals and marriages.
A persistent theme in the broken-promise-to-marry scholarship and in fictional literature is that from the Middle Ages to the present unscrupulous men have tricked credulous women with sexmotivated promises to marry 157 . In the late Middle Ages, paternalistic church and secular courts consistently sought to compel male seducers to marry their victims. Such suits typically involved low-status families and individuals. At the same time, church courts favored plaintiffs, regardless of gender, seeking to enforce informal betrothal and marriage vows. In the absence of an action at civil law to initiate a suit over a broken promise to marry, high-status families, like the merchant families of Florence, tended to rely on notarized betrothal contracts to avoid the suits and troubles attending informal promises to marry. Our research indicates that betrothal contracts, with their detailed specification of performance contingencies -principally large amounts of compensation and automatic judgment against the breaching party -succeeded in minimizing the occurrence of broken promises to marry. The experience of Florence differed from that of nineteenth-century England and the United States, countries in which a common law action for breach of promise to marry was well established and was used to launch thousands of suits. The large majority of plaintiffs were lower-and middleclass women seeking pecuniary compensation from ex-fiancés who, they asserted, had failed to keep their promises to marry. As Frost has shown, jilted women in Victorian England easily persuaded sympathetic judges and juries that they were deserving of compensation for unwanted pregnancies, lost jobs, careers forgone, humiliation, and emotional wounds. Compensation was especially needed for women who had already invested in costly wedding preparations. Frost appropriately admires these jilted women for asserting their rights 158 . Yet, there is also a paradox that in doing so they had to portray themselves as passive victims, and as Coombs observes, this portrayal was "contradicted by the very action of bringing suit" 159 . It is not surprising that these women became the objects of caustic criticism from legal and moral pundits and social critics like Charles Dickens (Pickwick Papers, 1836) and Gilbert and Sullivan (Trial by Jury, 1875). For them, female plaintiffs were heartless gold diggers and extortionists. Despite objections, the common law action of breach of promise to marry continued to be used by women to repair their lives well up until 1945. Only in 1970 did Parliament abolish the action. U.S. state courts and legislatures in the twentieth century have significantly curtailed the ability of jilted women to win suits over broken promises to marry. According to Tushnett, "the idea of pure, romantic, non-materialistic love became so powerful over the course of the twentieth century that courts could no longer fully analyze the ways in which the economics of marriages and planned marriages were linked to the emotions surrounding them. This shift in understanding worked against many women's material interests, as once-common and oft-successful female plaintiffs disappeared from the case reporters". 160 .
There is yet another contrast. In the late Middle Ages a sworn promise to marry was enforceable under canon law and the breaching party was held at fault and compelled to pay compensation.
The promise importantly entailed a change in the promisor's legal status. It was unlawful for the party already betrothed to make a promise of future marriage to another party. Today, in Europe and the United States, an individual's legal status is not at all altered upon the exchange of promises to marry or upon the performance of premarital requirements prescribed by law 161 . Under Italy's Codice Civile (1865), a mutual exchange of a promise to marry in the future is not binding (art. 53). The breaching party, however, may be liable for compensation, where the promise was rendered by a party of legal age, or a minor with proper authorization, in an atto publico (a declaration made before a public official attested by a sealed document, or a document redacted by a public notary), or in a scritta privata (one drafted by the parties themselves). In that event, the party who declines, without a sound reason, to fulfill the promise must compensate the aggrieved party for expenditures made in preparation for marriage (art. 54). The amount of damages must be limited to actual prenuptial expenditures. These provisions on prenuptial procedures, with minor modifications, remain in force (Codice Civile, art. 79-81) 162 . Further, a standard textbook on contemporary Italian family law, echoing medieval doctrines, stresses that a penal stipulation attached to a "promessa di matrimonio" has no legal force or effect 163 . State legislatures and courts in the United States take a minimalist approach and are no longer willing to assign fault to the party breaking a promise to marry or to grant compensation to the aggrieved party, even for expenditures made in anticipation of future marriage. Under current U.S. legal doctrines and case law, the value of a promise to marry may not be assigned a price. American women think otherwise. According to recent surveys, women overwhelmingly consider the engagement ring, an object on which Americans of all classes lavish extravagant devotion, a down payment that they should be allowed to retain when a fiancé breaks his promise to marry 164 . Under U.S. law, however, an ex-fiancé may recover any tangible gift (or its equivalent monetary value) given to a woman in anticipation of marriage, particularly the engagement ring, which today frequently costs thousands of dollars 165 . In Italy, either party, having exchanged promises of future marriage, may demand the return of gifts (including love letters, photographs, and jewelry) given in anticipation of marriage, except where other arrangements for the disposition of the gifts had been made by contract (Codice Civile, art. 80) 166 . The contrasts we have pointed out must not mask the robustness, through the centuries and in radically dissimilar historical settings, of promises of future marriage. In fact, betrothal promises, which have been the exclusive preserve of heterosexual couples, are now made by same-sex couples in Europe, the United States, and Canada. In Italy, the cities of Florence and Pisa have led the way in permitting same-sex couples to register as domestic partners. With regard to medieval Italy, further exploration of archival and legal sources is necessary to better understand the function of sponsalia among diverse social groups and regions. The basic questions of who contracted betrothals and where, when, and how they were contracted remain to be answered. The different and conflicting material and emotional meanings attributed to betrothal promises by communities, legal authorities, yesterday's patriarchal families, and today's autonomous and selffashioning individuals constitute a fascinating, ongoing chapter in comparative socio-legal history.
